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Abstract. Explainability is becoming a key requirement of AI applications. The
availability of meaningful explanations of decisions is seen as crucial to ensure a
wide range of system properties such as trustability, transparency, robustness, and
innovation. Our claim is that this need for explanation is part of a broader problem
related to the fact that most of the current architectures lack properly devised
channels for collecting and for propagating feedback about decisions and actions:
that is, they do not envisage nor support accountability. The aim of this paper is to
clarify the differences between the concepts of explainability and accountability,
which are often (and wrongly) used interchangeably. We draw a line of thought
seeing in accountability a key factor for innovation in AI applications, and we
suggest a paradigm shift from a need for explanation to a need for accountability.
1 Introduction
In the last few years, explainability has become more and more a central issue in the
development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques and its applications. As pointed
out in [22], the current generation of AI systems offer tremendous benefits, even in dis-
tributed applications and sensitive tasks, such as self-driving cars, healthcare support,
industry 4.0, etc. Their effectiveness, however, will be limited by the machine inability
to explain its decisions and actions to users. Explainable AI, in turn, aims at overcoming
this limit by enabling users to understand, trust, and manage this incoming generation
of AI systems. Indeed, AI systems, in particular in the field of machine learning, are
seen as “black boxes” because, in certain circumstances, even the designers cannot de-
termine why the system came up with a given decision in high-level, meaningful terms,
rather than relying on mathematical/statistical considerations. The problem is felt also
in the field of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) [32], where agents are, by their own na-
ture, autonomous, meaning that their decision-making process may be opaque to the
user and to the other agents. MAS proved to be valuable tools for software engineering
and business process modeling, and they effectively support the design and the realiza-
tion of distributed software systems. We beleive the MAS paradigm to offer powerful
abstractions for realizing such complex systems (composed of many independent, but
interlinked, components). In this context, the need of providing agents and MAS with
capabilities and infrastructures, that make decisions/behaviors explainable, emerges not
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only to provide the end user with human-understandable explanations, but also from a
software engineering perspective because the exchange of explanations between com-
ponents is functional to the objectives of the system as a whole. For instacne, in order
enable its components to successfully adapt to stressful situations.
We claim that this need for explanation is part of a broader problem, that is related to
the absence of properly devised channels for collecting and propagating feedback about
decisions and actions through a network of autonomous, yet interconnected, parts. We
believe that the concept of accountability can provide useful tools to fill this gap. We see
in accountability a key factor for innovation in AI applications, where by innovation we
mean the possibility to identify a need for change and act so as to improve the system in
a way that meets such a need. Consequently, we suggest a paradigm shift from a need
for explanation to a need for accountability.
Modeling Explanation Explanation has been extensively studied in philosophy, psy-
chology and cognitive sciences (for an in depth review see [28]). When referring to the
term explanation we can identify two different levels: (i) the process of explaining, and
(ii) the product of an explanatory process. The process of explaining generally consists
in giving an answer to a “why” question about a given statement of interest [23]. Within
the AI field, this process has been considered since the seminal work by Reiter [27], that
lays the foundations of Model-Based Diagnosis (MBD). Generally speaking, the diag-
nostic process provides an interpretation of the available observations about a system of
interest (i.e., symptoms), against a behavior model of the same system. The nature of the
model impacts on the nature of the explanation that can be actually inferred. When the
model keeps only the normal behavior of a system, diagnosis just infers a set hypothe-
ses that are consistent with the observations, but that are not necessarily a cause of the
observations. Conversely, when the model includes also abnormal behaviors, abductive
diagnosis [10] infers hypotheses that not only are consistent with the observations, but
are also root causes of the observations. Namely, hypotheses predict the observations
by means of the system model.
On the explanation side, the commonly adopted ontology divides an explanation
into two major constituents, the explanandum (the sentence describing the phenomenon
to be explained) and the explanans (the class of those sentences which are adduced to
account for the phenomenon). Still according to [23], which focuses on scientific expla-
nation, a proposed explanation is sound if its constituents satisfy certain conditions of
adequacy: (i) the explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans, (ii) the
explanans must contain general laws, (iii) the explanans must have empirical content,
(iv) the sentences constituting the explanans must be true.
Following the controversial position of [28], explanation is a pragmatic concept,
in the sense that the mechanism for producing it is geared to a specific audience and
selects elements to be kept or omitted accordingly. For this reason, explanations might
be incomplete and what is taken for granted might be omitted accordingly. Indeed, [24]
suggests that there are actually two processes in explanation, together with the product:
(i) a cognitive process in which the causes for the event are identified, perhaps in relation
to a particular counterfactual cases, and a subset of these causes is selected, and (ii) a
social process of transferring knowledge between explainer and explainee, generally
an interaction between a group of people, in which the goal is that the explainee has
enough information to understand the causes of the event.
Explainability needs accountability: an example In a distributed setting, where au-
tonomous agents are interconnected and interact, action and decisions are subject to the
availability of the right contextual information, especially when an agent has to deal
with abnormal events. In other terms, the relevant causal dependencies between events
(a good explanation) can only be built in the right context. The problem is that this
context is rarely the one in which the perturbation occurs, especially in complex sys-
tems, where each agent has only a partial view of the overall ongoing process. This can,
however, already be seen in simple systems, like the one described below.
Money withdrawal at an ATM involves two steps: (i) the user types the desired
amount; (ii) the money is provided. Suppose the typed amount is fed as a string (e.g.,
“100”), whose characters correspond to digits, and then it is parsed. A MAS realizing
the ATM could consist of a user agent, in charge of interacting with the user – namely
gathering the input, and providing the money –, and a parser agent, that receives the
input string from its partner agent and converts it into a number. If the string, that is
inserted by the user, is not a number in digits (e.g., “one hundred”) parsing fails. A
desirable behavior would be that the system, instead of crashing, were able to cope
with such a situation. To this end, a good explanation (i.e., an explanation containing
the information needed for recovery), should be built. Intuitively, such an explanation
would highlight that the user behaved erroneously, and should support to the ATM
system in deciding how to solve the problem.
Apparently, this is a simple task. However, when the parser is asked about the rea-
sons why parsing failed, it can only provide information belonging to its context of
operation: for instance, that it found an alphabetical character at index 0 in the string.
Let’s recall that the parser agent is unaware of the source by which data is fed as well
as of the aims for which the parsing is requested. This is why “its” explanation, which
is correct, turns out to be unsatisfactory. In other words, per se it is not really helpful
for recovering from the failure – at system level.
On the other hand, the availability of proper feedback, concerning the fault, in the
right context, can enable the successful identification of the root cause of the problem
and, thereby, the adoption of a suitable strategy for addressing it. In the case at issue,
only the user agent has the necessary contextual information for correctly interpreting
the account that is produced by the parser. If the parser notifies the user agent with
the relevant facts concerning the fault the latter will be in position for building an ex-
planation of what happened and, in the simplest case, decide that a new input must
be requested to the user. A more sophisticate implementation may even restructure the
agent-based ATM system: if it is found that users are keen on providing the amount in
words, the user agent could involve a new component, a natural language interpreter
agent, that is able to read such strings and turn them into numbers.
This example poses a fundamental question: is really only an explanation what is
missing in AI systems or do we need something else? As we have seen, an explanation
does not have an absolute value. This is especially true in case of complex and dis-
tributed systems. Its significance depends on the context in which it is produced, and
not every agent will be in position to produce explanations that are ‘good’ or ‘useful’
Fig. 1. A general scheme for accountability frameworks.
to certain aims, and that are functional to allow the system to adapt to a changing en-
vironment. In the following, we briefly explain how the notion of accountability can be
an effective tool for this purpose, since it supports the specification of an appropriate
infrastructure for building meaningful explanations.
2 Accountability in short
Accountability is extremely important in the human world, but it is a term with many
meanings. The kind of accountability we refer to, which is functional to innovation,
is well-described in a document by the “Executive Board of the United Nations De-
velopment Programme (UNDP) and of the United Nations Population Fund” [19].
UNDP’s accountability framework describes organization-wide processes for monitor-
ing, analysing, and improving performance in all aspects of the organization. It is an
essential function that allows verifying the achievement of results, and assessing per-
formance, based on actual data.
The framework gives managers the means to address recurring and systemic issues,
and to incorporate lessons learned into future activities. Inside the framework, account-
ability is supported, among other things, by formally documented functions, respon-
sibilities, authority, management expectations, policies, processes and instruments, a
(complex) infrastructure for enhancing capacity-building and continuous learning. The
reason is that organizations, like UNDP, are constantly evolving entities, with goals that
are hard to reach and cannot be achieved at once. Failure, or partial achievement of
the desired results, needs to be understood, conditions are examined, in order to either
modify the organizational goals (when they turn out to be unreachable in that context
with those resources) or to modify the organization itself, its practices, its structure, its
competences, in order to improve performance along time. Accounts are used also by
external bodies, with an oversight function, with the aim of verifying the adherence of
behaviour to specific standards.
Although accountability frameworks vary considerably, depending on the kind of
actors that are involved, on the kind of commitments, and on the activities that may be
put under scrutiny, the same can be seen in many other (human) organizations, e.g., [31,
34, 33, 25]: the accountability framework provides the infrastructure that is necessary
to a body made of many offices and individuals, geographically distributed, to collect
information and provide it to those who are competent to interpret it, to take decisions
and influence the future activity of the whole organization. Figure 11 draws a pretty
1 The picture is inspired by the framework schemas described in [30, 34].
general schema showing the loop that goes from decisions, and actions through report
to learning, a term that is used here to capture the modification of the organization itself
aimed at bettering its performance, based on the gathered accounts of those who were
involved. It is worth noting that this process is not an end in itself, but its ultimate goal
is to exploit the information obtained through the reporting activity to learn how to the
whole organizational structure can be modified and improved w.r.t. its objectives in a
virtuous circle.
The kind of accountability that is put at work in organizations is well-known in
sociology. Dubnick says that accountability “emerges as a primary characteristic of
governance where there is a sense of agreement and certainty about the legitimacy of
expectations between the community members.” [18]. Even though in many contexts it
is often associated to blame, this is but a partial view that disregards the potential arising
from the ability and the designation to provide response about something to someone
who is legitimated to ask [17]. Garfinkel, founder of ethnomethodology, considered it
as a basic mechanism that allows individuals to constitute societies [21, 26].
For what concerns modeling accountability in computational terms, basically, it can
be seen as a relationship between two parties: one of the parties (the “account taker”
or a-taker) can legitimately ask, under some agreed conditions, to the other party an
account about a process of interest; the other party (the “account giver” or a-giver) is
legitimately required to provide the account to the a-taker [1, 12]. As proposed in [5],
we ascribe to it two main dimensions:
1. Normative dimension, capturing the legitimacy of asking and the availability to
provide accounts, yielding expectations on the agents’ behavior;
2. Structural dimension, capturing that, for being accountable about a process, an
agent must have control over that process and have awareness of the situation it
will account for.
Intuitively, control means that a-givers are in position to produce an account, either
because they were directly involved in the attempt of bringing about some event, or
because they are in the position of getting the necessary information from other agents,
through their accountability. An information model encompassing accountability from
a computational point of view is presented in [4]. It captures what kind of data (facts)
must be available to develop systems that, in any situation of interest arising in a group
of interacting agents, allow the identification of account-givers.
3 Innovation through Accountability
The ability to evolve and innovate is an important property of software systems. By
this we mean the ability of a system to face abnormal events (i.e., perturbations) in a
constructive way, and leverage the information regarding the perturbation to restructure
and possibly improve the whole system. The availability of a feedback is crucial for
the realization of such a picture, yet not easy to obtain in case of distributed systems of
interconnected components. Broadly speaking, the feedback can be seen as a piece of
information concerning an execution of interest, that can be passed from one component
to another and be exploited to face perturbations.
Multi-agent systems, and especially multi-agent organizations (MAO), are powerful
abstractions that the Artificial Intelligence area proposes to build distributed systems.
MAOs [6, 11, 13–16, 20] are social structures defining how multiple agents ought to in-
teract in order to ensure a consistent global behavior oriented towards achieving one or
more organizational objectives. Key features of many organizational models are a func-
tional decomposition of the organizational goal and a normative system for coordinating
the agents - norms regulate the distributed execution, targeting the organizational goals
and capturing what agents have to do and which sanction is applied if they do not com-
ply. In other words, normative organizations provide the means to realize the correct
behavior, capturing what agents should do.
Accountability fits nicely in this picture, in the sense that it can seamlessly be inte-
grated inside MAOs for supporting innovation, in the explained sense. Indeed, by way
of accountability, a designer can specify how relevant information produced during the
achievement of goals flows from an agent to another through appropriate channel; the
objective is to provide an adequate context for the account-taker’s decision-making, for
instance, in front of abnormal situations. Accountability can, in fact, comes into play
when the feedback about a perturbation is reported to the agent who is responsible for
treating that perturbation. Generally speaking, treating a perturbation can mean restor-
ing the normal execution flow disrupted by that perturbation, either by acting directly
or by propagating the feedback to further agents. So, by enriching the specification of
an organization with a proper set of accountability relationships among the agents, a
designer can capture how the relevant information concerning abnormal events is to be
propagated along the organizational structure. This is, however, not the only possible
use of accountability that can support also the integration of oversight frameworks.
4 Conclusions
Many organizations, and international agencies (see e.g., [19, 31, 34, 33, 25]), recognize
accountability as a key component for the proper functioning of human organizations.
Accountability is, in fact, the mechanism through which important properties (such as
trust, transparency, and robustness, just to mention some), can be established within a
human organization. Some recent works [7, 8, 1, 5, 12] have pointed out how account-
ability is a useful concept also in software engineering, especially when the system at
hand can be seen as a multi-agent system.
In this paper, we have put forward how accountability is essential for innovation,
too. In software terms, accountability enables the collection and sharing of data, relevant
for the synthesis of explanations, upon which a decisor can select new objectives, or
can reconfigure the system to better meet dynamic contextual conditions. Innovation,
in fact, presupposes the deviation from norms [9]: the violation of norms is not always
bad, since it can sometimes lead to improving the whole system. In this process, the
account provided by the norm violator may hint a lack in the system, and the decisor
has, thus, the chance to solve the issue by changing the system itself.
In [1, 2, 5], we have proposed a first conceptual model of agent organization en-
compassing accountability as first-class element. These works outline how, by way
of accountability, a multi-agent system can enjoy the property of robustness against
known perturbations. To gain innovation, one has also to consider explanations (that
are purpose-oriented), and the strict relation that exists between explanations and ac-
countability. Some useful insights along this directions can be found in [12]. From an
operational point of view, our proposal to support accountability in an organizational
setting has found a first realization in [3], where a protocol for creating and manipu-
lating accountability relationships has been proposed. The main intuition is that, when
an agent joins to an organization, it must accept a set of accountability requirements,
expressed as social commitments [29]. The protocol specifies the shapes of these com-
mitments, and controls their creation. Accountability as a first-class modeling concept
is proposed in [1] as a complement to the specification of agent organizations. We,
then, presented two programming patterns for developing agents according to the ac-
countability specifications [2]. The proposal allows one to map an accountability spec-
ification into a set of well-defined agent plans. Such plans define the behavior agents
should exhibit to produce accounts for the goals they are responsible for, directed to the
agents entitled for treating them.
References
1. Baldoni, M., Baroglio, C., Boissier, O., May, K.M., Micalizio, R., Tedeschi, S.: Accountabil-
ity and Responsibility in Agents Organizations. In: PRIMA 2018: Principles and Practice of
Multi-Agent Systems, 21st Int. Conf. No. 11224 in LNCS, Springer (2018)
2. Baldoni, M., Baroglio, C., Boissier, O., Micalizio, R., Tedeschi, S.: Accountability and re-
sponsibility in multiagent organizations for engineering business processes. In: Post-Proc. of
the 7th International Workshop on Engineering Multi-Agent Systems, EMAS 2019, Revised
Selected Papers. pp. 3–24. Springer (2020)
3. Baldoni, M., Baroglio, C., May, K.M., Micalizio, R., Tedeschi, S.: Computational Account-
ability in MAS Organizations with ADOPT. Applied Sciences 8(4) (2018)
4. Baldoni, M., Baroglio, C., May, K.M., Micalizio, R., Tedeschi, S.: MOCA: An ORM MOdel
for Computational Accountability. Journal of Intelligenza Artificiale 13(1), 5–20 (2019)
5. Baldoni, M., Baroglio, C., Micalizio, R.: Fragility and Robustness in Multiagent Systems. In:
Post-Proc. of the 8th International Workshop on Engineering Multi-Agent Systems, EMAS
2020, Revised Selected and Invited Papers. LNAI, Springer (2020), To appear
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